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Abstract: Providing compensation for land conservation practices adopted 
by upstream farmers is still an alien concept in the Thai political context. 
The governance of common-pool natural resources, such as forest and 
water, has traditionally been under the control of powerful government line 
agencies, while the contribution of local communities to natural resource 
conservation have been hardly recognized by policy-makers. Drawing on a 
case study in Mae Sa watershed, Chiang Mai province, northern Thailand, 
this paper discusses the potential of developing compensation schemes in a 
socio-political context where upland farmers – mostly belonging to ethnic 
minority groups – tend to be considered a threat to the natural resource base 
rather than providers of environmental services. Based on data obtained from 
371 farm households in the upstream communities and 151 farm households 
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in the downstream communities of the watershed, upstream resource 
managers’ willingness to accept compensation for the conservation measures 
and downstream resource managers’ willingness to pay for water resource 
improvements were estimated through the use of choice experiments. 
Results from the study suggest that downstream resource managers would 
be willing to provide on average nearly 1% of their annual income for a 
substantial improvement of the quantity and quality of water resources, 
which could be achieved by compensating upstream farmers’ change of their 
agricultural systems towards more environment-friendly practices. Both 
willingness to pay of downstream respondents and willingness of upstream 
resource managers to accept compensation were positively correlated with 
age, education, participation in environmental conservation activities and 
previous experiences with droughts and/or erosion. The paper concludes that 
there is a potential for establishing compensation schemes for provision of 
environmental services in northern Thai watersheds if other actors, such as 
private businesses and local administration, contribute a substantial share of 
the budget and if all relevant stakeholders get involved in the institutional 
design of compensation schemes.
Keywords: Choice experiments, compensation schemes for ecological services, 
northern Thailand, water resource improvement
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1. Introduction
There have been rising concerns that upland watersheds in Mainland Southeast 
Asia deteriorate at a rapid pace due to a variety of reasons, with inappropriate 
agricultural practices among the most often cited (El-Swaify and Evans 
1999; FAO 1999; Kunstadter 2007). Excessive use of agrochemicals, high 
demand for irrigation during the dry season, and cultivation of annual crops 
without erosion control measures on sloping lands bring about problems of 
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reliability of water supply, loss of topsoil and contamination of water quality 
affecting downstream users. To address these problems, the adoption of 
soil and water conservation practices by upstream communities have been 
discussed as a potential solution. The voluntary uptake of such measures has 
been slow, however, since their adoption often reduces available land and 
requires more labour (El-Swaify and Evans 1999; Neef et al. 2007). In many 
cases, the effects of such measures can only be reaped in the long-term, while 
poor smallholders’ discount rates tend to be rather high. As downstream 
residents are the immediate beneficiaries of sustainable agricultural practices, 
the principle that upstream farmers need to be compensated for their losses 
when managing water and land in more sustainable and ‘downstream-
friendly’ ways has been increasingly accepted by academics, NGOs, 
donors and – more reluctantly – by national policy makers (e.g. Tomich 
et al. 2004; Swallow et al. 2005).
Providing compensation for agricultural conservation practices adopted 
by upstream farmers is a rather new concept in the Thai political context. The 
governance of natural resources, such as forest and water, has traditionally 
been under the control of powerful government agencies (e.g. Royal Forest 
Department, Royal Irrigation Department), while the contribution of local 
communities to natural resource conservation have been largely ignored by 
policy-makers (Vandergeest 1996; Ganjanapan 1997; Neef et al. 2006). A focal 
point of command-and-control environmental policies has been the northern 
part of the country where more than 50 percent of the country’s total forest area 
and the major head watersheds feeding the Chao Praya River, the lifeline of 
Thailand’s rice bowl, are located (Ganjanapan 1998; Laungaramsri 2000; Forsyth 
and Walker 2008). Drawing on a case study in Mae Sa watershed, Chiang Mai 
province, northern Thailand, this paper discusses the potential of establishing 
compensation schemes for watershed improvements in a socio-political context 
where upland farmers – mostly belonging to ethnic minority groups – tend to 
be considered as destroyers of forests and other natural resources rather than 
providers of environmental services.
In this study we attempt to simultaneously determine upstream and 
downstream resource managers’ willingness to engage in a compensation 
scheme that would reward upstream resource managers for shifting from their 
conventional agricultural practices towards environment-friendly practices, 
thus improving water resources for irrigation and household use of downstream 
resource managers. Hence, while recent studies in northern Thailand have 
focused on urban residents’ willingness to pay for resource improvements in 
northern Thai hillsides (Ahlheim et al. 2006; Frör 2007), this study provides a 
complementary perspective with its focus on internal compensation mechanisms 
among rural residents within a small mountainous river basin. Choice 
Experiments (CE) were used to elicit upstream resource managers’ willingness 
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to accept compensation for adopting environment-friendly agricultural practices 
and to determine downstream resource managers’ willingness to pay for water 
resource improvements through a change in upstream resource management. A 
logit model was applied to investigate socio-economic factors determining the 
willingness of both groups to engage in a compensation scheme.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: in section 2, we 
discuss the methodology and conceptual framework, including theoretical 
background, characterization of the study area, sample selection and model 
development. Empirical results of the choice experiments for both upstream and 
downstream farm households are presented and discussed in section 3. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
2. Methodology and conceptual framework
2.1. Theoretical background: choice experiment model
Choice experiments (CE) have their origins in conjoint analysis, a method 
that has been widely used to measure individual’s preferences in the areas of 
economics, transport, and geography (e.g. Green 1978; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
1985; Louviere 1988; Swait and Adamowicz 2001). Since the mid-1990s, 
CE have also been applied and discussed in environmental economics (e.g. 
Morrison et al. 1996; Hanley et al. 1998a). Valuation studies of non-market 
goods – for instance, the ecological value of a watershed – that employed CE are 
increasingly found in the economic literature (Hensher et al. 2006; Hanley et al. 
2007; Peterson et al. 2007) and there has been a lively scholarly debate regarding 
the advantages and limitations of CEs in comparison to other environmental 
valuation methods, such as Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) (Boxall et al. 
1996; Adamowicz et al. 1997; Adamowicz et al. 1998; Hanley et al. 1998b; Swait 
and Adamowicz 2001; Bateman et al. 2002; DeShazo and Fermo 2002; Rolfe 
et al. 2002; Rosenberger et al. 2003). Proponents of CE claim that elicitation 
of the willingness-to-pay and/or willingness-to-accept is more subtle in choice 
experiments than in a CVM interview and, as a consequence, the danger of 
strategic answers and protest bids by respondents is reduced (Ahlheim and 
Neef 2006; Yabe and Yoshida 2006). The use of CE helps in eliciting trade-offs 
that individuals make when choosing among alternative options or attributes. 
Through determining the amount of money that respondents would be willing to 
pay to effectuate a proposed change, it is possible to compute the marginal value 
of changes in each attribute. In many situations, such an approach may provide 
more realistic outcomes than focusing on a single change in the provision of the 
whole good which is a characteristic of most CVM studies (Mogas et al. 2006). 
With its emphasis on the combination of various attributes and levels, CE can 
be used for designing multidimensional policies, for conducting a cost–benefit 
analysis of such policy measures and for supporting conflict resolution and 
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negotiations over the protection and use of non-market goods (Bateman et al. 
2002; Mogas et al. 2006; Hanley et al. 2007).
CE can be applied to generate estimates of compensating surpluses for different 
attribute levels. Choice experimentation is based on random utility theory in which 
an indirect utility function is comprised of a deterministic element (Vi) containing 
the attributes of the situation, and an error term (εi). The model can be represented 
by the equation (1): 
U V Xi i i i i= + = +ε εβ
 
(1)
where Xi is a vector of attributes of the option and β is a vector of coefficients that 
reflect the relative importance of the attributes. Selecting one situation over another 
implies that the utility gained from the first situation (Ui) is greater than the utility 
gained from an alternative (Uj). The probability of choosing alternative i over j is 
represented by the form: 
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The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) 
with a type I extreme value distribution, a so-called Gumbel distribution, then 
equation (3) applies. The scale parameter λ is typically assumed to equal one and 
is inversely proportional to the variance of the error term.
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An estimated linear-in-parameters utility function for alternative i then comes in 
the form of equation (4):
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To obtain welfare estimates or compensation variation (CV) in choice experiment 
studies, the following general formula described by Hanemann (1984) is 
employed:
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where µ is the marginal utility of income, C is the choice set and Vi0 and Vi1 
represent the indirectly observable utility before and after the optional changes. 
When the choice set includes only one ‘before’ and ‘after’ alternative, equation 
(6) applies:
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From equation (6) it can be concluded that the marginal rate of substitution 
between two attributes is the ratio of their coefficients (Hensher and Johnson 
1981). The marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a change in attribute is then 
provided by equation (7).
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2.2. Study area
The Mae Sa watershed, Mae Rim district, Chiang Mai province covers an area 
of 142.2 km2 and extends from 20 to 45 km northwest of the northern city 
Chiang Mai (Figure 1). The watershed is intensively used for market-oriented 
agriculture, mainly fruit, flower and vegetable production. 80 percent of the total 
agricultural area of 1086 ha is under irrigation (Schreinemachers et al. 2008). 
The population is composed of northern Thai (khon muang) and the Hmong 
ethnic minority group. Of the total 3046 households in the watershed, 1309 
(43%) are engaged in agriculture on an average landholding of around 1 ha 
(Schreinemachers et al. 2008).
Major parts of the watershed are included in the Doi Suthep-Pui National Park, 
where agricultural activities are considered illegal under Thai environmental 
legislation. The watershed has been part of a pilot project of the Thai government 
to introduce river basin committees and sub-basin working groups to enhance 
Figure 1: Map of the study area Mae Sa watershed.
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public participation in water governance (Heyd and Neef 2006; Neef 2008). 
The Mae Sa Watershed Management Working Group is the first of its kind in 
Thailand. Recently, a sub-committee of the working group decided to establish 
the so-called “Mae Sa Watershed Conservation and Development Fund” with 
the objective of funding selected resource management projects that would 
improve watershed functions and services. The pilot project can thus serve 
as an example how such funds are established and how they can be further 
developed into viable compensation schemes for environmental services and 
– more specifically – for enhancing adoption of soil and water conservation 
practices by upland farmers.
2.3. CE design, sample selection, and model descriptions
This study applied the CM technique to examine upstream farmers’ preferences 
for different agricultural conservation measures, and downstream farmers’ 
preferences for various schemes of water resource improvement (Figure 2). The 
choice task required respondents to choose one outcome from a set of several 
possible alternatives (known as a ‘choice set’). Upstream respondents were 
presented with a series of 12 choice sets, while downstream farmers faced ten 
choice sets. Each choice set had three options, including a ‘no change’ option that 
characterized the status quo and two change options. The change options were 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework of the CE design.
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generated by varying the levels of each attribute according to an experimental 
design.
Due to their long-term research collaboration with local stakeholders in the 
watershed, the research team had gained the trust of the local population which 
helped to minimize strategic responses and political correctness in stating their 
willingness to pay/to accept. Respondent fatigue was controlled through small 
compensation in kind for the participants’ opportunity costs of time.
The CE study involved a number of methodological steps. The first step was 
to select attributes and set their levels. Attributes in this CE study were based on 
both supply- and demand-driven approaches. Under the supply-driven approach, 
attributes were derived from what policy-makers and/or researchers perceive to be 
factors that can be influenced by policy measures. The demand-driven approach 
involved selecting the attributes that individual or groups of upstream farmers 
consider important when making choices. In this study, four attributes were selected 
including installing water saving technology, planting vetiver (Vetiveria zizanoides) 
grass strips for erosion control, applying bio-insecticides and compensation or 
subsidy. The levels of each attribute were designed based on the costs involved. 
In each upstream sample village focus group interviews with village leaders and 
key informants in the field of water resource management were conducted in two 
rounds. First, the selected attributes and levels were discussed as regards their 
likelihood to be put into practice. Among various types of compensation, cash 
compensation was the most preferred option. The second round of discussions 
provided the final sets of attributes and levels that were used for designing choice 
sets for upstream farm households’ decision making. Each attribute consists of four 
levels as shown in Table 1 below. Orthogonal design using SPSS provided choices 
which were then used for designing 12 choice sets. Each choice set contains three 
alternatives, two alternatives were obtained from the designed choices and the other – 
the so-called status quo – refers to the ‘no change’ alternative, i.e. maintaining 
the existing utility of the current practice and receiving no compensation 
(see example in Figure 3). The randomly selected 371 farm households from 
seven villages with a total population of 776 households located in the upstream 
part of the Mae Sa Watershed were asked to state their preferences on willingness 
to accept compensation according to the 12 choice sets.
Table 1: Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiments for upstream farmers.
Attribute Level 
Application of bio-insecticides (% increase of area) 30, 50, 70, 100
Planting of vetiver grass strips (% increase of area) 10, 20, 30, 40
Installation of water saving irrigation system 50% micro sprinkler, 100% micro sprinkler,  
50% drip irrigation, 100% drip irrigation
Compensation (Baht/rai/year) 300, 546, 1010, 1717
Note: 1 rai=0.16 ha.
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In the case of the downstream area of the watershed, the same procedures as 
described for the upstream villages were applied to obtain attributes and levels of 
water resource improvement as shown in Table 2. Choice sets were constructed 
with three alternatives, namely two alternatives obtained from the designed 
choices and the status quo (see example in Figure 4). 151 farm households were 
randomly selected from the total 198 farm households that relied on water from 
the Mae Sa River for both irrigation purposes and for household consumption. 
Each respondent faced 10 choice sets.
This study used a simplified version of CE, which is constructed solely on 
the basis of non-price and price attributes of designed choices. Conditional 
logit models were employed to estimate implicit prices and willingness-to-pay/
willingness-to-accept compensation as depicted in the appendix. In order to 
investigate the influence of socio-economic factors on the respondents’ preferences 
a logit model was developed. The marginal effect of each socio-economic factor 
Figure 3: Example of a choice set for upstream farmers.
Table 2: Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiments for downstream farmers.
Attribute Level
Water for agriculture Level 1: No water shortage
Level 2: 1 month shortage
Level 3: 2 months shortage (status quo) 
Water for household consumption Level 1: No water shortage
Level 2: 1 month shortage
Level 3: 2 months shortage (status quo) 
Water quality Level 1: Drinking and cooking
Level 2: Household use
Level 3: Cultivation (status quo) 
Water fee (Baht/household/year) 525, 440, 300, 150 (status quo)
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could be estimated, providing the magnitude of the probability to choose improved 
alternatives over the status quo.
3. Results and discussion
3.1.  Upstream resource managers’ willingness to accept compensation  
for downstream-friendly practices
The major socio-economic characteristics of the upstream farm households in 
our sample are depicted in Table 3. The most important crops are vegetables, 
cut-flowers and fruit trees, mainly lychee. Farm sizes of northern Thai farmers 
are much smaller than those of their Hmong peers, but they also have less family 
members to feed. Average per capita income in Hmong communities is generally 
lower than that of the northern Thai communities, the latter being engaged in 
more intensive farming systems, often in greenhouses.
Table 4 shows the conditional logit model results with respect to upstream 
farmers’ stated willingness to accept compensation for switching to more 
environmentally friendly practices. The signs of the parameters are consistent 
with theory and a priori expectations. The negative coefficients for applying bio-
insecticides and planting vetiver grass suggest that these attributes contribute 
negatively to utility and therefore need to be compensated for. Marginal 
willingness to accept was estimated by dividing the attribute coefficient with 
the price coefficient. The figures show that the upstream farmers would need to 
Figure 4: Example of a choice set for downstream farmers.
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be compensated at the rate of about 100 Baht per ha and year for applying bio-
insecticides on 1% of their agricultural area. For a 1% increase of area planted 
with vetiver grass strips upstream farmers would need a compensation of more 
than 400 Baht per ha and year. These results suggest that the willingness to adopt 
vetiver grass under a compensation scheme is lower than the willingness to 
adopt bio-insecticides, reflecting farmers’ scepticism vis-à-vis soil conservation 
measures that reduce land available for profitable crops.
The coefficients for installing micro-sprinkler systems on 50% of the area 
and for installing drip irrigation on 50% and 100% of the area respectively have a 
positive sign which means that farmers do not need any compensation for adopting 
these practices. These results indicate that upstream farmers are increasingly 
aware of the need to switch to water-saving irrigation technologies as competition 
among water users within the same community and upstream-downstream conflicts 
between neighbouring communities have dramatically increased in recent years 
(Neef et al. 2006; Becu et al. 2008). In focus group discussions, upstream farmers 
stated their willingness to invest in such water-saving technologies, if they were 
assured that they would have sufficient access to water around the year.
Table 3: Socio-economic characteristics of the upstream communities.
Village No. of 
sample 
house-
holds
Major crops 
(in % of 
agricultural 
area)
Total household 
income (and 
average per 
capita income) 
(Baht/year)
No. of 
family 
members
Farm size 
(ha)
Ethnicity
Buak Chan 53 Vegetables 62% 
Flowers 13%
Fruit trees 9%
119,352.92
(13,261.44)
9 1.91 Hmong
Buak Toei 
and Pang 
Lung
30 Flowers 50%
Vegetables 20%
Fruit trees 10%
101,988.83
(14,569.83)
7 1.33 Hmong / 
Northern 
Thai
Pha Nok 
Kok 
52 Vegetables 84%
Flowers 6%
Fruit trees 8%
122,347.18
(20,391.20)
6 1.50 Hmong
Mae Sa 
Mai/Mae 
Sa Noi
118 Vegetables 52%
Fruit trees 38%
86,627.75
(10,828.47)
8 1.49 Hmong
Pong Krai 23 Vegetables 65%
Flowers 34%
80,523.91
(16,104.78)
5 0.64 Northern 
Thai
Pong Yang 
Nai
44 Vegetables 79%
Flowers 16%
113,569.32
(28,392.23)
4 0.31 Northern 
Thai
Muang 
Kam
51 Vegetable 75% 
Flowers 22%
169,405.29
(42,351.32)
4 0.39 Northern 
Thai
Source: Own survey 2007/2008.
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Table 5 depicts the regression results of the logit model employed to understand 
the socio-economic factors that influence upstream farmers’ willingness to engage 
in a compensation scheme supporting the adoption of environment-friendly 
agricultural practices.
Age and education played a significant and positive role in the willingness 
to adopt environmentally friendly practices under a compensation scheme. 
Households with a high number of family members (mainly belonging to the 
Hmong ethnic group, cf. Table 3 above) engaged in farming and with vegetable 
production as the main activity were also more likely to adopt such practices. 
Another positive influence on willingness to adopt stemmed from previous 
experiences with on-site soil erosion, water shortages in the household and drought. 
If farmers were member of an environmental conservation group they also had a 
higher probability to engage in such compensation schemes. On the other hand, 
household heads who perceived themselves as rich or medium wealthy were less 
willing to adopt environmentally friendly practices than their poorer peers.
The fact that poorer resource managers had a higher willingness to engage in 
a compensation scheme for providing better ecological services can be attributed 
to two reasons: first, poorer farmers usually suffer from low tenure security and 
adopting soil and water conservation measures improves their reputation among 
government officials, thus reducing the risk of losing their land rights (cf. Neef 
Table 4: Model results of upstream farmers’ willingness to accept compensation for adopting 
environmental friendly practices.
Attribute Model output Willingness to accept  
(Baht/ha/year) for 1%  
increase of areaCoefficient Z-statistics
Application of bio-insecticides –0.0017 –1.8918** 101.63
Planting vetiver grass strips –0.0070 –2.8761*** 423.63
Installation of water saving 
irrigation system (50% of area 
under micro-sprinkler)
 0.1233  2.4925*** –
Installation of water saving 
irrigation system (100% of area 
under micro-sprinkler)
–0.0450 –0.7555 –
Installation of water saving 
irrigation system (50% of area 
under drip irrigation)
 0.1041  2.2628** –
Installation of water saving 
irrigation system (100% of area 
under drip irrigation)
 0.2863  5.8049*** –
Compensation  0.0001  1.7434*
Note: Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Source: Own analysis.
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et al. 2006). Second, poorer households regard a viable compensation scheme 
as a way to generate a secure stream of cash income and to reduce their general 
livelihood risks, while more affluent farm households have accumulated their 
wealth through intensification of agriculture and are less willing to give up 
practices that have proved economically viable for them in recent years.
3.2.  Downstream resource managers’ willingness to pay for upstream  
water resource improvement
Downstream resource managers’ agricultural systems are more homogeneous 
than the farming systems of their upstream counterparts. 31.2% of the agricultural 
area is under paddy rice, longan orchards constitute 28.7% and the area planted 
with soybean accounts for 13.6% of the total agricultural area during the rainy 
season (Schreinemachers et al. 2008). The major socio-economic characteristics 
of downstream resource managers are depicted in Table 6. The average farm size 
is just below one hectare. Many young people have moved to the nearby city of 
Chiang Mai to find non-farm income opportunities, reflected in a high age of the 
remaining farm population and a high share of non-agricultural income (78.1% of 
the total household income).
Table 5: Regression results of socio-economic factors determining upstream farmers’ willingness 
to participate in a compensation scheme for environmental friendly agricultural practices.
Socio-economic factors Coefficient Z-statistics Marginal 
effect
Constant  0.2590  1.0651  0.04560
Age of household head (years)  0.0099  2.8251***  0.00175
Education (years)  0.0377  3.7109***  0.00664
Vegetables as main crop (yes=1, no=0)  0.2082  2.6567***  0.03719
Family labour in agriculture (persons)  0.0586  2.9943***  0.01032
Household perceived as rich (yes=1, others=0) –1.1442 –4.2812*** –0.25184
Total household income (Baht/year) –2.76E–07 –1.1409 –4.86E–08
Ratio of agricultural income to household income –0.0587 –0.4149 –0.0103
Household perceived as medium wealthy (yes=1, others=0) –0.4638 –3.9463*** –0.07554
Past erosion experiences (yes=1, others=0)  0.3076  2.9715***  0.05165
Past household water shortage experiences (yes=1, no=0)  0.4072  4.5109***  0.06932
Past drought experiences (yes=1, no=0)  0.4164  4.9670***  0.07363
Be a member of environmental conservation  
group (yes=1, no=0)
 0.2704  2.9558***  0.04609
Total income (Baht/year) –2.76E–07 –1.1409  0.00000
Ratio of agricultural income to total income –0.0587 –0.4149 –0.01033
Log likelihood function –2355.326
Number of observations 4,452
Number of respondents 371
Note: Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Source: Own analysis.
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Downstream residents take water for non-food household use, e.g. for bathing 
and laundry, mainly from a communal water system fed by the Mae Sa river and 
its tributary creeks (Table 7). Only a minority of the households use water from 
ponds or groundwater (cf. Sangkapitux et al. 2007). Due to health concerns, most 
households buy their drinking water in bottles from nearby water companies. Only 
a quarter of the households use water from the community-based water system for 
their food and usually they would boil the water first before they drink it. For 
irrigation, most farmers can use water from the Mae Sa River only, while a small 
privileged group of farmers in the lowest part of the watershed have access to 
another water source, coming from the Mae Taeng irrigation dam.
Results of the CE’s conditional logit model for the downstream resource 
managers are presented in Table 8. Apart from the attributes of one-month water 
shortage for both cultivation and household use, all attributes are statistically 
significant at the 99 and 95% level. The positive coefficients of sufficient water 
for cultivation and drinking for the whole year and good water quality for drinking 
and household use (laundry, bathing, etc.) suggest that these attributes contribute 
positively to the respondents’ utility, while the attribute ‘water fee’ showed a 
negative coefficient. Hence, the signs of the parameters are consistent with theory 
and a priori expectations.
The implicit price or marginal willingness to pay could be estimated by dividing 
the attribute coefficient with the price coefficient. The willingness to pay of the 
Table 6: Socio-economic characteristics of downstream resource managers.
Socio-Economic Characteristics Mean
Age (years) 57.43 
Education (years) 5.05 
Farm size (ha/household) 0.99 
Agricultural income from rice and soybean (Baht/household/year) 38,754 
Non-agricultural income (Baht/household/year) 138,452
Source: Own survey 2007/2008.
Table 7: Water sources of downstream resource managers.
Water source Non-food household 
use consumption
Drinking and 
cooking
Agriculture
 Community-based water system (pipes) 118 (78%) 38 (25%) –
 Pond  24 (16%) 21 (14%) –
 Groundwater   9 (6%)  5 (3%) –
 Bottled water – 87 (58%) –
 Mae Sa River only – – 71 (86%)
 Mae Sa River and Mae Tang Irrigation Dam – – 12 (14%)
Source: Own survey 2007/2008.
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downstream farmers to move from the status quo to improved water resources 
along the different attribute levels is calculated as indicated in equation (5) above. 
The results show that the downstream farmers’ willingness to pay was highest with 
755.19 Baht per household per year for having the water quality improved from 
its current status (sufficient quality for irrigation) to drinking water quality. This 
is followed by the willingness to pay 737.42 Baht per household per year to avoid 
drought problem for agriculture, and 477.43 Baht per household per year to mitigate 
water shortage for household use. The lowest amount of money that the downstream 
resource managers are willing to pay is 178.68 Baht per household per year to 
obtain good water quality for household use (laundry, etc.). The results imply that 
downstream resource managers give the first priority to the aspect of water quality 
improvement as the welfare estimate is found highest, followed by the welfare 
improvement obtained from an elimination of water shortages for irrigation.
The welfare estimate indicates that the average downstream farm household 
is willing to pay 1492.61 (737.42+755.19) Baht per year for an improvement 
of water resources from the status quo (2-month shortage and insufficient water 
quality for drinking and other household use, such as washing) to sufficient water 
around the year and good water quality for drinking. This amounts to about 0.8% 
of the average household income of downstream communities.
Table 9 shows the regression results of the logit model determining the socio-
economic factors that influence downstream farmers’ willingness to participate 
in a payment scheme for water resource improvement. Age and education of the 
household heads in the downstream communities were positively correlated with 
willingness to pay for an improvement of water resources. Farm households with 
high acreage and rice as the main crop were also more likely to participate in a 
compensation scheme. Those households that were characterized by a low water 
Table 8: Model results of downstream farmers’ willingness to pay for improved water resources.
Attribute Model output Implicit Price 
(Baht/household 
and year)
Willingness to pay 
(Baht/household 
and year)Coefficient Z-statistics
Sufficient water quantity for 
cultivation (no water shortage)
 0.7090  9.45*** 377.59 737.42
One-month water shortage for 
cultivation
 0.0007  0.0095 – –
Sufficient water quantity for 
household use (no water shortage) 
 0.4590  5.12*** 368.71 477.43 
One-month water shortage for 
household use
 0.0537  0.5327 – –
Good water quality for drinking  0.7261  5.98*** 238.71 755.19
Good water quality for household 
use (e.g. laundry, bathing)
 0.1718  3.41***  89.34 178.68
Water fee –0.0019 –2.01**
Note: Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Source: Own analysis.
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resource security – reflected in a low diversity of water sources for irrigation, past 
drought experiences and the need to buy bottled water for consumption – had 
a higher probability to get involved in such payment schemes (cf. Sangkapitux 
and Neef 2006). In accordance with the results from the upstream part, resource 
managers who had previously been engaged in environmental activities and 
supported an improvement of the ecological status of the watershed were more 
willing to contribute financially to an improvement of water resources.
On the other hand, a high share of non-farm income had a negative effect 
on willingness to pay. This result is particularly relevant for policy-makers and 
for the appropriate design of compensation schemes since rapid development in 
northern Thai cities and rural-urban migration may further reduce the share of 
farm revenues in rural people’s income portfolio.
3.3.  Bringing upstream and downstream resource managers together  
in a payment scheme for environmental services
Based on the conditional logit model results depicted in Table 8 (Section 3.2) 
an estimate of the total willingness to pay of the 198 farm households in the 
downstream area for improved water resources could be calculated at 295,537 
Baht (6157 Euro) per year. By contrast, the estimated total compensation needed 
for upstream farmers to adopt bio-insecticides on 30% and grass strips on 5% 
Table 9: Regression results of socio-economic factors determining downstream farmers’ 
willingness to participate in a payment scheme for water resource improvement.
Socio-economic factors Coefficient Z-statistics Marginal 
effect
Constant   –3.7701 –3.3298*** –0.14335
Age of household head (year)    0.0449  3.5542***  0.00171
Education (year)    0.0813  2.0147**  0.00309
Household member (person)    0.0321  0.4244  0.00122
Agricultural labor (person)    0.0800  0.4763  0.00304
Rice is the main crop (yes=1, no=0)    1.0915  3.8863***  0.05497
Size of land (rai)    0.0897  3.0107***  0.00341
Ownership right (owner=1, non-owner=0)    0.2673  1.1038  0.01002
Non-farm income (Baht/year)   –2.83E–06 –3.3264***  0.00000
Frequency of past drought experiences    0.1505  2.5304***  0.00572
Participation in environmental activities (yes=1, no=0)    1.7206  4.1121***  0.04362
Support of Mae Sa watershed improvement (yes=1, no=0)    1.7293  5.8578***  0.12892
Use water from Mae Sa river and Mae Taeng irrigation 
system (yes=1, no=0)
  –0.4603 –1.7899* –0.01654
Buy bottled water for drinking (yes=1, no=0)    0.9873  3.9629***  0.04270
Log likelihood function –318.1640
Number of observations 1510
Number of responders 151
Note: Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%; 1 rai=0.16 ha.
Source: Own analysis.
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of their combined agricultural area1 is 6,288,300 Baht (131,006 EUR) per year, 
according to the figures in Table 4. This means that around 4.7% of the amount 
needed to compensate upstream resource managers could be collected from 
downstream resource managers in the watershed, while the remainder would 
need to be contributed by other stakeholders (e.g. tourist resorts, drinking water 
companies, waterworks authority). For the implementation of a viable, long-term 
compensation scheme, an appropriate institutional framework would need to 
be set in place. It is also crucial that potential beneficiaries of improved water 
resources are certain that free-riders are excluded from the scheme and that the 
services they are asked to pay for are delivered in a reliable way. This principle 
of conditionality, however, poses considerable problems because it is unclear to 
what extent upstream resource managers would need to change their practices in 
order to achieve the standards requested by downstream water users.
Lack of trust between beneficiaries and providers of environmental services is 
probably one of the most constraining factors in setting up viable compensation 
schemes. Particularly in the Thai socio-political context, trust levels between 
potential beneficiaries/buyers of environmental services (e.g. downstream resource 
managers, water work authorities, drinking water companies, urban residents) and 
upstream providers/sellers of environmental services cannot be taken for granted 
and would need to be gradually built up in the course of designing appropriate 
compensation schemes. Experienced and trustworthy intermediary organizations 
can play a crucial role in (1) facilitating the institutional design of such schemes, 
(2) mediating in the negotiations that need to take place in their implementation, 
and (3) setting up appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
In the Mae Sa watershed, such a role could be played by the “Mae Sa Watershed 
Conservation and Development Fund” (MSWCDF) established in 2007 under 
the Mae Sa Watershed Working Group, a pilot project of the Thai government 
towards greater stakeholder involvement in managing the kingdom’s water 
resources (Neef 2008). The primary objective of the MSWCDF is to fund various 
activities devoted to sustainable management of water resources and to minimize 
potential conflicts resulting from water use both in quantity and quality aspects. 
In principle, it has been agreed that the fund’s management committee would 
involve representatives from all stakeholder groups. Two elected chief executives 
from the four sub-district (tambon) administrative organizations (TAOs) in the 
watershed are entrusted as chairman and vice-chairman of the fund respectively. 
Yet, appointed representatives from government line agencies, such as the 
Watershed Management Unit (WMU) and the Water Resources Department’s 
regional office, are also involved in managing the fund’s budget, although they 
cannot contribute financially to the fund due to inhibiting ministerial regulations 
1
  The total agricultural area in the upper part of the watershed is 1217 ha. It would be unrealistic 
to assume that all upstream farmers would adopt environment-friendly practices on their entire 
agricultural area.
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on budget expenditure. Given their history of not being very conducive to 
stakeholder participation in natural resource management, these organizations 
would need to build up a great deal of trust in order to gain the support of other 
local stakeholders.
Until October 2008, no concrete measures have been taken apart from 
designing a logo and setting up donation boxes at major tourist and business 
locations in the watershed. Voluntary monetary contributions are expected from 
all major stakeholder groups involved in water resource use. The agreement upon 
the regular contribution on an annual basis in order to sustain the funding scheme 
is still under negotiation. In its latest meeting in September 2008, the MSWCDF’s 
committee agreed that each of the four TAOs should contribute at least 50,000 
Baht (1042 Euro) in the 2009 fiscal year for supporting various activities that 
would improve watershed services, such as removing sediments from the rivers, 
constructing check dams and reforestation.
Being one of the first of its kind in Thailand, the MSWCDF set up as a 
pilot project does not fully reflect the idea of a payment scheme for ecological 
services since all stakeholders in principle could benefit from the fund, not just 
the potential service providers, which are primarily the upstream communities. 
However, a compensation scheme could be easily incorporated in this type 
of fund. Hence, the creation of this fund can be seen as a positive sign and 
a first step towards supporting the principles of Payment for Environmental 
Services (PES). A proposed institutional framework for such a PES scheme is 
depicted in Figure 5. Such a framework could then serve as a model for other 
Figure 5: Proposed institutional framework for a PES scheme in Mae Sa watershed.
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watershed areas where upstream and downstream stakeholders are willing to 
engage in negotiations and compensation schemes for improved agricultural 
and ecological practices in a watershed context.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
Most resource managers in northern Thai watersheds are smallholder farmers 
and tend to be among the poorest and most marginalized groups of society. 
It has often been argued that these people are driven by short-term economic 
interests only and are not willing to engage in efforts to sustain the ecological 
functions of mountain watersheds in the long run. Yet, as this study shows, both 
upstream and downstream resource managers in the Mae Sa watershed are aware 
of a deteriorating environment and are likely to get involved in compensation 
schemes for environmentally friendly agricultural practices. The finding that the 
poorer groups among the upstream farmers are more willing to engage in such 
compensation schemes underscores the potential of PES to become an effective 
tool for poverty alleviation by its ability to provide a continuous, albeit modest 
stream of income. Results also suggest that such schemes may not be viable 
when designed only as an agreement between upstream and downstream resource 
managers within the boundaries of a watershed. Other local stakeholders in the 
area (e.g. private businesses, local administration) and urban residents will need 
to provide the bulk of the compensation needed to effectuate changes in land use 
practices. Binding agreements and strategic alliances among service providers, 
beneficiaries and credible and experienced intermediaries will be crucial 
components of such schemes.
At the national level a specific regulatory framework in support of 
compensation schemes for ecological services needs to be established to facilitate 
the implementation of compensation measures on a broader scale. Yet, this 
requires a dramatic shift in policy-makers’ mindset: they need to move from 
ineffective command-and-control regimes with an exclusive focus on ‘fixing 
uplanders’ destructive resource management practices’ towards incentive-based 
approaches that embody both upstream and downstream resource managers. While 
this study’s focus was on monetary compensation, the allocation of secure, but 
conditional resource entitlements to farmers and/or communities in upland areas – 
as successfully tested in other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia – could 
be an additional incentive to adopt agricultural conservation practices under such 
compensation schemes.
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Appendix
Attribute-based model for upstream farmers
Yij  =  f (VET, BIO, IRRDA, IRRMH, IRRMA, IRRDH, COMP) (8)
Yij  =  1 if respondent j says ‘yes’, and 0 if ‘no’ to choice i
VET: percentage of planting vetiver grass which are 10%, 20%, 30%, 
and 40% 
BIO: percentage of area applying bio-insecticides which are 30%, 
50%, 70%, and 100%
IRRMH  =  1 for 50% of area under micro-sprinkler,   =  –1 for status 
quo,   =  0 for others
IRRMA  =  1 for 100% of area under micro-sprinkler,   =  –1 for status 
quo,   =  0 for others
IRRDH  =  1 for 50% of area under drip irrigation,   =  –1 for status 
quo,   =  0 for others
IRRDA  =  1 for 100% of area under drip irrigation,   =  –1 for status 
quo,   =  0 for others
COMP: compensation which are 300, 546, 1010, and 1717 Baht/rai
Attribute-based model for downstream farmers
Yij  =  f (AGRY, AGRI, CONSY, CONSI, QUALA, QUALL, WATFEE) (9)
Yij  =  1 if respondent j says ‘yes’, and 0 if ‘no’ to choice i
AGRY  =  1 for no water shortage for cultivation,   =  –1 for status quo  
(2-month shortage),   =  0 for others
AGRI  =  1 for one month shortage for cultivation,   =  –1 for status quo 
(2-month shortage),   =  0 for others
CONSY  =  1 for no water shortage for consumption,   =  –1 for status 
quo (2-month shortage),   =  0 for others
CONSI  =  1 for one month shortage for consumption,   =  –1 for status 
quo (2-month shortage),   =  0 for others
QUALA  =  1 for water quality for consumption, household uses 
and agriculture,   =  –1 for status quo (water quality for agriculture 
use),   =  0 for others
QUALL  =  1 for water quality for household uses and 
agriculture,    =  –1 for status quo (water quality for agriculture 
use),   =  0 for others
WATERFEE: water fee at the levels of 525, 440, 300, and 150  
Baht/rai
Note: 1 rai  =  0.16 ha.
